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. The island groups of French Polynesia, which had not 
experienced any really devastating cyclones since the 
beginning of the century, were hard hit several times 
between December 1982 and April 1983. This paper reviews 
the cost of damage from these cyclones and shows how 
lowered public awareness of the hazard in a low-frequency 
area combined with the special economic conditions 
prevailing in the Territory to make the total cost much 
higher than it need have been. Ways and means of 
rehabilitation are analyzed. The development of the thermal 
imbalance in the Pacific, which appears to have triggered 
this series of natural disasters, only seemingly exceptional, 
is briefly discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Between December 1982 and April 1983 the archipelagoes 
which make up the Territory of French Polynesia were hit 
by a strong tropical storm and five tropical cyclones which 
caused extensive material damage and fifteen fatalities. 
This disastrous series is of special interest because, at first 
glance, it appears highly exceptional: not since the 
beginning of the century had these island groups been 
struck by any really destructive cyclones (Fig. 1). 
The recent cyclones seem to have originated from a 
regiona1,'and possibly global, thermal imbalance, the role if 
not the causes of which they confirmed (NOAA-UNDRO, 
1983). y 
FRENCH POLYNESIA AND THE CYCLONE HAZARD 
The 120 islands of French Polynesia are divided into four 
groups known as the Marquesas Islands, the Tuamotu- 
Gambier Archipelago, the Society Islands (Windward and 
Leeward) and the Austral Islands (Fig. 1). In an oceanic 
area roughly equivalent to the total surtace of Europe, these 
islands barely amount to 4,000 k m 2  of land. More than 
t 
half the population (about 150,000) is concentrated in the 
capital town and main harbour of Papeete and its suburbs, 
on the island of Tahiti, which by itself carries 70% of the 
inhabitants (of whom 80% are Polynesian or part 
Polynesian), on slightly over one quarter of the total 
emerged land surface. 
The local economy is dominated by Services and 
administrative' activities, and relies heavily on financial 
spin-offs from the French Nuclear Testing Centre in the 
Pacific (Centre d'Expérimentation du Pacifique - CEP). 
France pays 70% of the Territory's expenditure. Coconut 
plantations, pearls, fisheries and tourism are the main local 
sources of income. 
French Polynesia is well linked to the rest of the world, 
has sixteen fully equipped airports for domestic flights and 
an excellent telecommunications network. If necessary, the 
assistance of military planes and ships permanently based 
in the Territory may be requested. They are called out 
whenever the application of an emergency procedure 
(ORSEC Plan) is decided upon by the local Department of 
Civil Defence, as in Metropolitan France. 
Although the archipelagoes of French Polynesia may be 
expected to experience tropical storms, available historical 
records do not point to this being a high-risk zone. Various 
sources (Visher, 1925; Giovannelli, 1940; Teissier, 1969; 
Service Météorologique de Polynésie Française, 1979, 1982) 
enumerate 62 known tropical depressions or cyclones as 
having passed through the area over the past 150 years. 
The only destructive cyclone in the 19th century about 
which detailed eye-witness reports are available, occurred in 
February 1878. Subsequently, three severe cyclones caused 
close on 700 deaths in 1903, 1905 and 1906, mainly in the 
Tuamotu group. There appear to have been no further ones 
till 1966, and the few cyclones (a total of eight) recorded in 
the region after this date and until the recent series did not 
result'in any casualties nor any serious damage. 
During the 1982-1983 season however, nine tropical 
depressions, six of which reached cyclone strength (average 
wind speeds above 116 km/hr), moved through or skirted 
French Polynesia. 
This high frequency must be considered in relation to the 
climatic and hydroclimatic anomalies that have been 
occurring in the tropical areas of the Pacific Ocean since 
1982 and may well have facilitated cyclogenesis. 
(1) The oceanic area south of loos, which includes the 
Society and Tuamotu Islands, recorded surface water 
temperatures exceeding by 2OC the seasonal average values. 
The variation was greater near the equator where the 
up-welling disappeared. 
(2) A westerly current replaced the south-easterly sub- 
tropical current and helped the propagation of a KELVIN 
wave. It brought warm, moist and unstable air masses from 
the western Pacific into the northern parts of French 
Polynesia in the second half of 1982. 
(3) The intertropical convergence zone was located south of 
the equator as early as November 1982. It merged with the 
secondary convergence zone of the South Pacific to form a 
large low pressure area lying between latitudes 10 and 15's 
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Fig. 1. Destructive cyclones in French Polynesia since 1900. 
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and extending from the 180th meridian to the coast of 
South America. 
The reasons for these hydroclimatic and synoptic 
anomalies, which could be useful for long-term weather 
forecasting, are not yet clear, despite the rapid progress of 
knowledge about oceaxdatmosphere interactions. This 
paper will deal only with the effects of the recent cyclones, 
more particularly in comparison with the cyclones 
previously experienced by French Polynesia. 
FRENCH POLYNESIA’S CYCLONE HISTORY 
Except for a few fragmentary data on earlier occurrences, 
detailed accounts and reports by eye witnesses are available 
only for the 1878, 1903, 1905 and 1906 cyclones. They were 
collected by Teissier (1969). It would be interesting to search 
the Polynesian oral tradition for clues to the prevalence of 
atmospheric disturbances before the arrival of the 
Europeans and up to the 19th Century. 
6 4 t h  February 1878. The most severely affected area was 
the northwestern part of Tuamotu group, and the hardest 
hit atolls were Rangiroa, Kaukura and Anaa. Several 
villages were destroyed by the sea., In Kaukura, the greater 
part of the population was caught unprepared in temporary 
dwellings put up in the northern part of the atoll for the 
copra-making season. One hundred and seventeen people 
died. In Anaa, the village of Tuuhora was razed to the 
ground, except for the church. It was to be destroyed again 
in 1906 and 1983. 
13-16th January 1903. A cyclone of similar force but a 
greater span hit the central part of the Tuamotu group, 
severely damaging about ten atolls and killing 515 people. 
In Hikueru, where several hundred people from neighbour- 
ing atolls were temporarily settled in the most exposed area 
for the collection of mother-of-pearl shells, 377 died. Nearly 
100 people perished in Marokau, either by drowning or 
when the church where they had taken shelter collapsed. 
The survival strategies used during this cyclone (people 
scrambling to higher locations, or huddling in boats 
anchored in the lagoon) and the cyclone’s action and effects 
as described by witnesses were all again observed during the 
1983 cyclones: the prolonged flooding of the low-lying areas 
by the sea, the devastating action of breakers armed with 
debris, the washing away of all arable soil, the accumulation 
of thick layers of crushed coral (see Fig. 21, as well as the 
floods caused by torrential rains on the “high” islands 
(Marquesas and Society groups). 
21-25th March 1905. A cyclone of similar strength hit the 
northern and western atolls of the Tuamotu group (Napuka, 
Takaroa, Arutua and Apataki). It caused much damage on 
the eastern coast of Tahiti, together with several shipwrecks, 
and took the lives of eight people. 
7-9th February 1906. A strong, very extensive (some 350 
nautical miles in diameter) and fast moving cyclone affected 
a large number of atolls in the Central Tuamotus, .the 
northern and eastern coasts of Tahiti, the Leeward islands 
in the Society group and the Gambier islands. Out of a total 
death toll of 123, all but two people were killed in or near 
the atolls. Shipwrecks caused 17 deaths. Everywhere, the 
heaviest damage resulted from the action of the sea. The 
cyclone tide rushed a good 200 m into the centre of Papeete, 
destroying the habour facilities, a number of public 
Fig. 2. Coral fragments piled up by the sea in the main 
village on Hao atoll. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the 1982-1983 cyclones 
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buildings and more than 300 houses. On the windward side 
of Tahiti, the northern coast of Taiarapu peninsula was dev- 
astated (as it was again in 19831, the hardest-hit being the 
village located on the low-lying little peninsula of Tautira, 
which was completely flattened by the storm tide. Because 
people managed to reach the nearby mountain slopes, the 
casualty toll was lighter than might have been expected. 
THE CYCLONES OF TIlE 1982-1983 SUMMER 
The most striking feature brought out by Table 1 is the 
coQmparatively small number . .  of human casualties. This may 
be accounted for b e '  
- '.'Improved forecaiting, warning systems and tele- 
communications (people were told to take emergency 
measures for safety 10 to 26 hours b'efore the actual 
strike, depending on places). 
. - The lack of fortuitous population concentrations in risky 
locations and temporary settlements, as was the case in 
1878 and 1903 on the atolls. 
- The rapid succession of cyclones which led people to 
take precautionary measures in spite of their unfamiliar- 
ity with the hazard. 
Two thirds of the deaths were caused by shipwrecks (8) or' 
by being swept off a ship (2). Four out of the five others were 
caused by collapsing buildings or. falling trees; the remain- 
ing one was by electrocution. Most of the injuries were 
caused by flying debris, falling trees or collapsing buildings. 
However, the glaring inadequacy of the.  housing in 
relation to the hazard; its location in exposed areas having 
already been directly hit; the lack of collective shelters on 
the atolls; and the undisciplined behaviour of some people 
who acted without due care after the cyclone warnings had 
been issued, make it tempting to ascribe this light toll in 
part to chance and sheer good luck. 
Table 2 summarizes the main types of direct damage 
caused by the cyclones in the various island groups. 
THE COST OF THE CYCLONES 
The currency in use in French Polynesia is the Pacific 
Franc (value: 0.055 French Franc). For convenience, all the 
quoted value figures were converted into U.S. dollars at the 
uniform rate of eight French Francs to one U.S. dollar. The 
total cost of the direct damage sustained was estimated to 
be between 8100 and 115 million. For the sake of 
comparison, French Polynesia's total budget was 8157 
million in 1982. A percentage breakdown of the cost of the 
direct damage caused by the successive cyclones in the 
different island groups is given in Table 3. 
In the Tuamotu group, the cyclones affected only villages 
and village-type community facilities, the one exception 
being the military base on Hao atoll. The relatively large 
proportion of the damage borne by the Windward islands 
reflects the high concentration of population, hence of 
housing, infrastructures and activities in these islands. 
Damage might have been far worse, since none of the 
cyclones came within 50 km of the coast of Tahiti to 
threaten Papeete directly. 
Total direct damage to productive sectors of the economy, 
infrastructures, transport systems and communication net- 
works, but excluding housing, personal belongings, public 
buildings and coconut plantations, amounted to nearly 832 
million. Neither the indirect losses incurred by the produc- 
tive sectors, nor the damage to French military buildings 
and infrastructures on the island of Tahiti and on Hao, Fan- 
gataufa and Mururoa atolls have been taken into account. 
Breakdown of damage to productive sectors is as follows: 
- Agriculture, livestock, forestry: nearly 85 million. 
- Fisheries and pearl farming: nearly 83 million (2.5 
million in the Tuamotu group alone). 
- Handicrafts and industry: nearly 81.5 million, more 
than half of which was to electric power plants in a 
rather undiversified sector. 
- Tourism and the hotel trade: nearly 85.2 million, 3.9 
million of which was to officially registered hotels which 
are mainly located in the Society islands. 
- Business activities: more than 83 million. The total of 
the above sums comes to over 817 million. 
The total cost of damage to infrastructures (road systems, 
harbour and airport facilities, bridges and transport 
systems, telecommunications networks), amounted to nearly 
815 million. More than three quarters of this sum will be 
spent on the necessary repair'works and on building 
collective shelters on the Tuamotu atolls. 
Table 3. The cost of the direct damage caused by successive cyclones in the different island groups 
Percentage 
of total 
damage 
caused 
Leeward Marquesas Islands Gambier 
Lisa 34 66 2 
Nano 57 43 5 
Oraiiia 10 83 7 14 
Keva 40 40 15 5 21 
Veena 90 7 3 57 
W ill ia ni 100 1 
Percentage of total damage 
experienced 63 9 22 6 100 
. 
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Available figures and data for the cost of the cyclones that 
struck at the beginning of the century are inadequate for a 
proper comparison to be made. It is however clear that in 
terms of the consequences of natural hazards, French 
Polynesia has followed the global trend of a considerable 
increase in the cost of property damage, together with, for 
an equal risk, a striking decrease in the death toll. 
The total amount of direct damage does not include the 
cost of the secondary or indirect consequences of the 
cyclones. These consequences, which may sometimes prove 
positive, are always difficult to evaluate with any accuracy. 
We shall merely outline some of the more significant 
fea tures. 
French Polynesia possesses about 50,000. ha of coconut 
plantations, many of which are old and poorly cared for. 
Most of them are located in the Tuamotu Islands. Tuamotu 
copra is bought from producers at a guaranteed price that is 
heavily subsidized by the territorial government which also 
pays out of the local budget for collection and transport to 
an oil factory in Papeete. The factory’s processing capacity 
(28,000 tons) is far greater than the current total copra 
production (19,000 tons). Wastage of nuts and loss of 
cyclone-felled trees is estimated to have halved the total 
production anticipated for 1983. More than two thirds of 
the losses occurred in the Tuamotu group. Production is 
expected to return to normal levels in the Leeward group of 
the Society archipelago in 1984 and to reduce the deficit by 
more than half. But the secondary effects of the shaking 
received by the palms, and injuries to root and leaves, are 
likely to make themselves felt for five or six more years. 
The traditional land tenure system in force in these 
islands, which is based on joint ownership, led the 
authorities to adopt a collective and indirect mode of relief 
and rehabilitation, involving the regeneration of coconut 
. 
plantations. 
Joint ownership and secondary damage effects raise 
similar problems as regards rehabilitation of individual 
orchards on the atolls, where breadfruit, limes and bananas 
are often cultivated on soil brought in especially from 
“high” islands. 
Indirect and secondary effects may also impede the 
rehabilitation of pearl farming, a fast-growing activity 
which has generated employment for a large number of atoll 
people. 
Tourism is another economic sector where the secondary 
effects of the cyclones appear difficult to control and9 to 
evaluate. The number of visitors to French Polynesia rose 
from 20,000 in 1966 to 115,OOO in 1982. The reaction of the 
main tourist sources (North America, Western Europe) to 
the negative image of Tahiti created by this unexpected 
series of cyclones was awaited with great concern by the 
local Tourist Bureau, whose apprehensions turned out to be 
justified. 
While the total number of tourists visiting French 
Polynesia in the first three months of 1982 was 35% higher 
than over the same period the previous year, it rose by only 
1.5% in 1983 as compared with the same period in 1982. 
Figures for the following three months (20.3 and 1.9%) 
showed the same trend. The reaction of the French market 
was particularly marked in this quarter with the number of 
visitors dropping more than 6% below the 1982 second 
quarter total. 
RELIEF AND REHABILITATION 
As the cyclones followed one another,. relief operations 
initiated by the authorities became more and more 
exceptional. The economic and political background was to 
Fig. 3. Damage by the sea at Ahe, Tuamotu, in cyclone 
Orama: the result of the “flotation effect“ on a house. 
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Fig. 4. The central part of Tuuhora village after cyclone 
Orania. Note the damaged church and evidence of the 
action of the sea. Photograph reproduced with permission 
of Navy Squadron 12 S .  
some extent responsible for this: an economic slump 
aggravating unemployment, and local elections (for the 
designation of the districts’ local councils and mayors) 
coinciding with discussions between the local and French 
governments to define a new status of “extended 
autonomy” to the Territory. Under the present Set-up, the 
local (territorial) government has to set apart funds from its 
own resources, or create new resources by raising levies or 
loans, for any economic rehabilitation operations. The 
central (French) government provides funds for emergency 
relief, notably to help individuals having lost all or part of 
their personal belongings. A total of 86.9 million was 
earmarked for such direct assistance, but only one fifth of 
thi-s amount had actually been made available to the local 
authorities by the end of August 1983. 
To coordinate relief and reconstruction, the local 
government established a Territorial Agency for Rehabil- 
itation (TAR). The remedial operations undertaken by 
TAR, will be described below. The repair of general 
public infrastructures and the rebuilding of community 
facilities will entail a total outlay of between 848 and 69 
million. If central government funding and reimbursements 
by insurance companies are also taken into account, the 
amount of funds spent on rehabilitation will come to at least 
half of the total assessed value of the damage. The 
government of French Polynesia will raise the funds needed 
partly from its own budgetary resources, partly by levying a 
special 0.5% tax (of CIF value) on imported goods (except 
for essential foodstuffs), and partly through loans. 
The levy is expected to produce 810 million. Loans from 
local banks (816 million) and from the French Government 
financial institution known as the Central Fund for 
Economic Cooperation (824 million a t  4% interest) will 
provide the bulk. 
It is important to note that a technical committee for the 
study of prevention of natural hazards was set up by the 
local government practically at  the same time as TAR. Since 
then, various groups of the committee have been 
investigating prevention, safety and preparedness measures 
to be taken in order to minimize the effects .of possible 
future cyclones. 
RECONSTRUCTION OF DWELLINGS 
Housing was rightly considered as the first priority of the 
rehabilitation policy. Damage to the houses of the well-to- 
do was as common though not as serious as damage to the 
vulnerable dwellings made of light European-type materials 
such as wood, various kinds of panels and sheet iron. In 
fact, traditional materials and building techniques have 
now virtually disappeared from the French Polynesian 
scene. Preventive attempts to strengthen structures as the 
cyclones drew near were made seldom, or in an ineffectual 
or dangerous manner. Self-built housing is predominant in 
these islands and even where houses are erected by 
tradesmen, basic safety rules are often incompletely applied 
or totally disregarded in the construction process. Hence 
ignorance, unconcern and irresponsibility might, to a great 
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ant €or the high amount of damage to housing, 
Sntrvfgs made after the cyclones by town planning and 
housing authorities suggested that at least 80% of the 
destsiictfon of housing resulted from structural defects or 
faulty building practices. 
A TAR survey showed that out of a total of 3,522 
dwelliugs destroyed or damaged in Tahiti and the 
neighbouring island of Moorea, 493 had lost their roofing 
only and 933 their whole roof, including the frame. The 
OY igin OB lhe complete destructions (totalling 1,218 houses) 
oftea h y  ikl the  inadequate size of the structural elements, 
or the absence of any proper structure. On the coastlines of 
0x1 islands as well as in the inhabited parts of the 
atolls, t11e impact of the wind was compounded by the storm 
iide producing a flotation effect and baQering waves (see 
Reconstruction programmes had to tackle two apparently 
incompatibk tasks at the same time:rehousing the many 
homeless families as quickly as possible, and initiating a 
proper prevention policy. For the low-lying islands, the 
solution of collective shelters was preferred, because of the 
high additional costs that large-scale adaptation of 
individual horises to the hazard in highly vulnerable sites 
would hava: entailed. In the past, as also during the last 
cyclones, churches often served as collective shelters, 
successfully in many instances, as on Anaa. But a number of 
them were also partly or totally destroyed, and this fact 
undediam their unreliability (see Fig. 4). 
About forty collective shelters are to be erected in the 
Tuamotu group, on the inhabited atolls with permanent 
populatîons ranging from 10 to 1,OOO people. 
These shelters will be multi-purpose and fitted out for 
daily ux as a town hall, hospital or radio-room. The total 
cost shoiild be h t h e  vicinity of 87 million. Ten of them were 
to be completed by the end of 1983 on the atolls where the 
hazar1 ir; greatest. Technically, stilts were preferred to 
raised platforms which are costly and require the use of 
heaky equipment that is difficult to bring ashore on most of 
the atolls, 
The problems raised by the rebuilding of individual 
dwellings are more complex. The vulnerability of the houses 
was certainly, in many cases, perpetuated by slipshod 
repairs and makeshift rebuilding. New building regulations 
are shnrtljr to be adopted for public buildings, making them 
capabit of withstanding windspeeds of over 200 km/hr, but 
will be dj%c& to enforce in respect of individual private 
homc~,, t3vcrall improvement is bound to be slow and will 
1' .2qui7~ large-scale education of the public and probably 
insq'-ixe incentives, if not constraints, as well. 
TAR's action in the different archipelagoes varied 
according to priorities and the relative urgency of local 
needs. In the Tuamotu group, quick intervention was 
required because of the total destruction of housing on 
many atolls and the decision to build collective shelters. At 
th2 beginning of August 1983, one third of the 
rr.constrnction programme had been completed there. 
Sumying and drafting of plans for the new village of 
TenuXauia, OM Anaa, the only village that was to be re-sited, 
-.rere completed in September (Fig. 5). 
i n  the Leeward Islands as in the Marquesas, homeless. 
;he qDjol J Q  
Fig. 3). 
Fig. 5. Planned relocation of Tuuhora, the only village to be 
re-sited. 
i 
l 
Fig. 6 .  Shipment of materials for the reconstruction of 
Tuamotu villages in the harbour of Papeete (Tahiti). The 
ship is designed for easier unloading on the atolls. 
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families (respectively 823 and 78) were sent the materials 
they needed to repaitvor rebuild their dwellings (Fig. 6). In  
these island groups, where the Agency was not directly 
involved, the circumstances and effectiveness of the 
reconstruction differed from one island and/or district to 
another, depending on how individualktic or cooperative 
the people were and on the local authorities - mayor, 
mutoi (local policeman) - who were responsible for sharing 
out the materials received from TAR amongst the families. 
Cases of abuse of this power were not rare. 
For the rebuilding of completely destroyed dwellings, 
TAR designed an extendable house with an integrated and 
bolted timber frame covered with 9 mm plywood sheets for 
the walls, and a sheet-iron hipped roof. This type of house is 
in conformity with the new standards that are supposed to 
be gradually adopted. A model house was erected in every 
district and TAR technicians trained instructors (usually 
taken from among district council workers) to help people 
build their new homes. The amount of assistance given 
varies with the manpower available in each family. 
For partly dastroyed dwellings in Tahiti and Moorea, 
TAR provided free materials and technical assistance to 
families. People requiring assistance were classified 
according to a set of criteria including number of 
dependents, homeowner's status (if tenant, amount of rent 
paid), extent and location of damage sustained and total 
family income. Using this classification, TAR plans to give 
direct assistance for the repair and reconstruction of more 
than three quarters of the'3,522 damaged houses and for 
the replacement of more than 80% of the 1,218 totally 
destroyed houses. The total cost of this aid programme will 
exceed 611.7 million, three quarters of which will be spent 
on new building and the rest on repairs. 
By August 1983, about one third of the families having 
had their houses partly destroyed and meeting TAR 
eligibility requirements had received assistance. Almost one 
quarter of the new houses were ready to be put up and 
distribution to families was about to begin. 
Distribution of damage to housing in Tahiti and Moorea 
in relation to population size may be seen from maps (Fig. 
7). The southern part of the windward coast and the 
northern part of Taiarapu peninsula were, with the north- 
east coast of Moorea, the most severely affected areas, 
notably by cyclone Veena. 
REHABILITATION IN THE PRODUCTIVE! SECTORS 
In Septembèr 1983, the local apthorities were intending 
to allocate between 5 and 9 million dollars through TAR to 
the rehabilitation of the productive sectors. 
In the agricultural sector, TAR will give priority 
assistance to the 2,000-odd farmers and stock-breeders who 
declared damage or loss of their production instruments 
(machinery, buildings), which will be reimbursed at an 80% 
rate, and production losses, reimbursed at  a 50% rate. 
About 20% of the individual files approved for assistance 
had been processed by the end of August 1983. The total 
cost involved should reach 62.3 million. Besides this, TAR 
will contribute to the rehabilitation of coconut plantations 
by expanding a regeneration programme that was already 
underway before the cyclones struck. One active adult in 
every coconut-gowing family will be paid to plant young 
selected palms in the most seriously damaged plantation 
areas on 17 atolls. As many as 290 families are likely to 
participate in this programme in 1983, the target being to 
replant 1,ooO ha out of a potential surface area of 3,500 ha. 
About 280 ha of replanting had been completed on Anaa 
Kaukura, Ahe and Tikehau by the 1st September. The dual 
purpose of the programme is to provide producers with a 
complementary source of income until yields return to 
normal levels, while ensuring increased production in the 
future. 
In the fisheries sector (including pearl farming), TAR 
funding should be about 61.4 million, two thirds of this sum1 
being spent in the Tuamotus. Remedial action will focus on 
rehabilitation of the fishing fleet (160 boats were totally 
destroyed or lost, 100 suffered at  least 50% damage), 
replacement of fishing'gear and rebuilding of fishtraps, and 
provision of new equipment such as cold storage facilities. 
As regards pearl farming, only the small privately owne'd or 
cooperative ventures will receive assistance from TAR. The 
bulk of the funds will go into fishing boats. 
Rehabilitation of the tourist sector will absorb less than 
one million dollars. TAR assistance will be provided for 
buildings only. The French Government and special local 
development schemes set up during the last 10 years will 
give some assistance for replacement of 'fittings and 
furnishings lost or damaged in hotels. Indirect losses will 
not be considered and the smaller the hotels the higher the 
rate of compensation will be. In the special case of village- 
level tourist accommodation (rooms rented out by local 
people) common in the Tuamotus, assistance will be as for 
private dwellings, with some additional technical control. 
THE FUTURE OF THE REHABILITATION POLICY 
The infiuence of the economic and social background 
Some feel that the injection into the local economy of 650 
to 60 million by rehabilitation programmes, together with 
the mobilization of personal savings and bank loans to cope 
with the problems created by the cyclones, could prove 
beneficial. 
Demand should be stimulated and unemployment drop, 
initially in the building and public works sectors, and 
subsequently in all branches of activity as rehabilitation 
funds fan out (Sacault, 1983). Other close observers of the 
local economy point out, however, that the unusual needs 
arising from the cyclones had, after six months, mainly 
brought about a decrease in private spending. Most families 
appear to have tried to meet their extra needs out of their 
normal earnings rather than by drawing on their savings, 
thus thwarting any chance of an economic boost. 
Though not enough time has elapsed for the situation to 
be viewed in proper perspective, one may well wonder in 
any case how long such an hypothetical boost could last and 
what shape it would take in an economy of the French 
Polynesian type. 
In recent years, services and administration (i.e. civil 
service departments, dependent on either the local or the 
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central government) accounted for about 80% of the G.D.P. 
It is difficult to see therefore how rehabilitation could 
stimulate the badly damaged productive sectors sufficiently 
to propel the Territory towards economic self-reliance. The 
CEP alone brought in 819 million in customs duties paid on 
goods and equipment imported in 1982, and its total annual 
expenditure in recent years has been in the vicinity of 8100 
million (two thirds of which went in salaries). It is 
interesting to compare these amounts with the funds made 
available to the various local investment and development 
schemes: a combined total of 82.65 million in 1982. 
Even though its supporting services were reduced in 1976, 
CEP remains the crux of a political problem to which all the 
economic and social aspects of the life of the Territory are 
related. I t  is indeed easy to understand how maintaining aid 
and, at the same time granting wider political autonomy 
might be the counterpart of activities that public opinion 
(local as well as national, regional and international) views 
with some misgivings. 
These facts'need to be borne in mind if, in this particular 
instance, we wish to heed the excellent advice given by Keefe 
et al. (1976) and take the naturalness out of "natural" 
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disasters. 
While there is no doubt as to the direct physical causes of 
the 1982-1983 cyclones, their effects were profoundly 
modified by the political, economic and social context in 
which they occurred. 
The magnitude of the damage done was of course partly 
due to an unusual and dramatic succession of atmospheric 
phenomena, but it may also be explained by lowered public 
awareness of a low-frequency hazard in a region where each 
of the widely scattered tiny islands has pnly the slightest 
chance of experiencing a direct hit. The lack of 
preparedness is illustrated by widespread non-observance of 
basic safety rules in the building trade (Fig. 81, vague 
regulations which are either ill-adapted to the actual hazard 
or simply disregarded (as in the case of telephone and 
electricity networks for instance), the absence of collective 
shelters on islands or sites recognized to be highly 
vulnerable, the inadequacy of vital installations such as 
water reservoirs, meteorological and telecommunications 
buildings, emergency reserves of food and medical supplies. 
The disproportionate magnitude of the damage resulting 
from the lack of preventive measures also reflected the 
peculiar nature of the local economy. However marked 
social inequalities may still be, the Territory, thanks to the 
financial resources generated by CEP and to the advantages 
associated with its present status, boasts a GNP per head of 
64,100, which is far higher than that of most of the other 
island states or territories in the South Pacific. This has 
given rise to generalization of consumer habits and lifestyles 
involving the use of costly materials, installations and 
commodities (see Fig. 9), but which did not make the coun- 
try any better prepared for the cyclone hazard. Concrete 
houses were frequently destroyed for example, on the atolls 
as well as in Tahiti (Fig. 10). The atolls and the remotest 
island settlements are now equipped with sophisticated 
installations (electric power, telephone, video systems) 
which the cyclones showed extremely vulnerable. Full 
development of the small remote islands is part of a general 
policy aimed at  arresting the decline of their traditional 
activities anil the migration of their population to the urban 
area of Tahiti. The rapid growth of Papeete and its power of 
attraction are also indirectly to blame for the severity of the 
damage sustained by the islands’ coconut plantations. The 
resulting neglect of regeneration and proper maintenance 
no doubt increase their vulnerability. One should also bear 
in mind the part played by the system of traditional land 
tenure that probably causes a lack of incentive. 
While the high density of housing in exposed sites may in 
some cases be considered as resulting from this system, real 
estate speculation and the rising cost of building land 
associated with urban growth certainly reinforced the 
tradition of coastal settlement. Sea oriented tourism further 
intensified this trend. High-risk settlements, on the shore or 
close to rivers prone to flash floods (Figs. 11 and 12), were 
only able to spring up because of loose regulations. In this 
respect, much damage could have been avoided or reduced. 
It would be interesting to make an in-depth study of 
individual and group behaviour during and after the 
cyclones- in relation to the degree of urbanization, 
underemployment, current questioning of traditional 
values, and group rivalry illustrated by competition for local 
political power at  various levels. 
Many examples suggest that these factors played a 
significant role during and immediately after the cyclones 
Fig. 8. Housing ill-adapted to the cyclone hazard: effects of 
cyclone Veena. 
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Fig. 9. -What are the priorities? - A roofless house and a 
hi-fi system drying out in Tahiti after cyclone Veena. 
and that they are still hampering the rehabilitation process. resulting from “exceptional” circumstances involved, 
The Territory’s particular political structure indeed affords rehabilitation may now be well under way and its financial 
central metropolitan and local authorities numerous requirements secured. Improvement of prevention and 
opportunities for dispute and encroachment. preparedness ought to be on a par with this effort, but 
Notwithstanding a certain amount of improvization unfortunately the heightened awareness of the risk 
Fig. 10. Concrete house on Tuamotu atoll destroyed by wind 
and sea in cyclone Orama. 
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observable after the cyclone strikes seemed already to be 
waning in September 1983. 
Very few practical measures had been taken to adapt the 
infrastructures and to improve zoning of settlements. The 
building of the public shelters had not begun. Local 
newspapers were fanning the latent concern that subsists in 
the population by journalistic highlighting of reports on the 
regional hydroclimatic imbalance, but no real programme 
of education and conscience-raising for preparedness had 
been launched. 
The role of the regional climatic background 
The cyclones of the 1982-1983 summer underscored the 
reality of a latent cyclone hazard ,in all the archipelagoes 
forming French Polynesia, and th '- even greater vulnerabil- 
ity of the low islands on account o 9 the associated hurricane 
tide. The climatic and oceanic disequilibrium prevailing in 
the tropical latitudes of the Pacific since the end of 1982 was 
most marked during the first quarter of 1983. I t  may well, at 
the time, have created the thermal conditions conducive to 
the development of cyclonic depressions in the central part 
of the Pacific, but it has diminished since (Rougerie, 1983). 
In August 1983, the positive deviation from the seasonal 
mean of the surface water (O to 60 m) temperature was still 
1 O C .  In the Marquesas area,, the atmospheric pressure, 
which had been below mean values for one year, was back to 
normal. The equatorial westward current had also resumed, 
Finally, numerous sea birds, which had left places such as 
Christmas island (2 ON-158 OW) when the equatorial 
upwelling disappeared, were gradually coming back to their 
usual feeding grounds, and this seems to be an additional 
indication of the return of normal hydroclimatic conditions. 
If this trend persists, one can reasonably expect French 
Polynesia, especially its central and eastern parts, to enjoy a 
cyclone-free summer in 1983-1984. 
In the western part (Society Islands), however, vigilance 
should not be relaxed because of the statistically higher 
frequency of the risk between the Cook Islands and the 
Austral (or Tubuai) group. An active prevention and 
preparedness policy, based on enforcement of appropriate 
regulations and general education of the people, should be 
implemented concurrently with the rehabilitation pro- 
grammes. 
CONCLUSION 
Weather forecasting and warning systems, and the 
special civil defence organization for emergencies, generally 
performed well during the 1982-1983 cyclones in French 
Polynesia and undoubtedly helped to reduce the cost in 
human lives of a series of events that reminded the 
population and the authorities of the permanence of the 
cyclone hazard. 
These capabilities however only constitute a small part of 
the general organization that any country located in a 
cyclone-prone area should possess. In the case of French 
Polynesia, not only do a number of external factors enhance 
the potential consequences of ìhe hazard, but the, vast area 
covered by the Territory and the geographical scattering of 
its island groups make the task of organizing the 
appropriate response exceedingly complex. The major 
difficulty lies in the special vulnerability of a large part of 
the coastal settlements including, in particular, the city area 
Fig. 11. Storm surge floods a house in a vulnerable location 
on Tahiti's east coast. 
, 
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Fig. 12. Partially damaged houses after cyclone Veena, on a 
hazardous coastal location common in Tahiti. 
of Papeete, its harbour and its international airport. 
The cyclone hazard is shared, under comparable 
conditions, by many South Pacific countries. Hence the 
importance, for French Polynesia, of being included in a 
regional organization whose establishment was recently 
considered, and which would coordinate disaster prepared- 
ness strategies in the area." 
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